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The occupational risk of blood-borne infection in 
healthcare workers and students – collectively termed 
healthcare professionals (HCPs) – is a significant 
yet under-researched area in medical practice, 
especially in the developing world. Although many 
viral pathogens have been associated with occupational exposure, 
three are known to pose the most serious risk: HIV, hepatitis B virus 
(HBV) and hepatitis C virus (HCV). The route of transmission can 
be percutaneous or mucosal and is related to the work environment 
and practices of HCPs.[1]
Importantly, not only are HCPs at risk of acquiring these infections, 
but once infected they also pose a risk to patients. This has serious 
policy implications and raises significant ethical challenges. HCPs 
and patients in developing countries, especially South Africa (SA), 
are particularly vulnerable to occupational and nosocomial exposure 
because the prevalence of HIV and HBV is much higher than 
in the developed world. The work environment may contribute 
further to this risk, because injection routes are frequently used for 
administration of medication and improper venesection practices 
and inadequate facilities for sharps disposal are common.[1,2] Medical 
and dental students and junior doctors are at high risk owing to their 
developing skills level, frequent exposure to invasive procedures and 
long working hours. Two studies in large teaching hospitals in SA 
reported that 55% and 64% of interns, respectively, reported one 
or more episodes of occupational exposure. Exposures were more 
common among first- than second-year interns (62% v. 38%), and 
only 64% of percutaneous injuries involving HIV-infected blood were 
reported.[3,4]
Many international bodies have developed guidelines for the 
prevention and management of infection with blood-borne viruses 
(BBVs) in HCPs. SA, however, does not have management guidelines 
in place, and large disparities in disease burden, work practices and 
healthcare resources complicate adoption of international guidelines. 
This article attempts to frame BBVs in the local context and suggests 
strategies for prevention, reporting and management responsibilities 
in a developing-world context.
Prevalence and transmission risk
The exact prevalence of BBV infection in SA HCPs is unknown, but 
is estimated to mimic that of the general population: HBV 0.2 - 16%, 
HIV 17.9% and HCV ~2.4%. The risk of occupational infection is 
highest for HBV (30%), followed by HCV (1 - 2%) and HIV (0.3%). It 
has been estimated that globally 66 000 HCPs have been infected with 
HBV through occupational exposure, 1 000 with HIV and 16  000 
with HCV.[5] Rare cases of patients contracting HIV from infected 
HCPs have been documented, but the exact risk of provider-to-
patient transmission has not been quantified.[6] Estimated figures are 
derived from settings of low HCP HIV prevalence (0.4% and 0.7%), 
and figures may well be higher in settings where high prevalence is 
coupled with late diagnosis. Transmission of BBVs is associated with 
exposure-prone invasive procedures (EPPs) (Table 1), inadequate 
infection control precautions and drug diversion by HCPs who abuse 
injection drugs, and determined by the circulating viral burden.[7]
Prevention
Standard universal precautions (Table 2) should always be followed, 
regardless of the perception of risk of the procedure or the patient. 
The use of safety-engineered devices such as retractable syringes, 
needle-free intravenous systems and winged butterfly needles is 
encouraged. The following disease-specific measures are also advised.
Hepatitis B virus
Proof of immunity (arbitrarily defined as a hepatitis B surface 
anti body (anti-HBs) level >10 IU/L) or knowledge of infection 
status should be a mandatory requirement for all HCPs. HCPs 
are required to be vaccinated against HBV before they start their 
training, but no compulsory systems are in place to document 
immunity or to exclude pre-existing chronic HBV infection. HBV 
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Table 1. Classification of EPPs*
Procedures and techniques Examples
Major abdominal surgery General surgery, nephrectomy, small-bowel resection, cholecystectomy, 
transplantation surgery
Obstetric/gynaecological surgery Abdominal and vaginal hysterectomy, caesarean sections and vaginal deliveries, 
cone biopsy, ovarian cyst removal, other transvaginal obstetric and gynaecological 
procedures involving hand-guided sharps
Cardiothoracic surgery Valve replacement, coronary artery bypass grafting, other bypass surgery, heart 
transplantation, repair of congenital heart defects, thymectomy, open lung biopsy
Orthopaedic surgery All orthopaedic surgery, total knee arthroplasty, total hip arthroplasty, major joint 
replacement surgery, open spine surgery, open pelvic surgery
Head and neck surgery Subtotal thyroidectomy and all surgery involving bones, including oncological 
procedures
Neurosurgery Craniotomy, other intracranial procedures, open spine surgery
Plastic surgery Extensive cosmetic procedures, e.g. abdominoplasty and thoracoplasty
Oral or maxillofacial surgery Surgical extractions, hard- and soft-tissue biopsy, apicoectomy, root amputation, 
gingivectomy, periodontal curettage, mucogingival and osseous surgery, 
alveoplasty or alveoectomy, endosseous implant surgery
Trauma surgery and procedures performed in the emergency 
department
Open head injuries, facial and jaw fracture reductions, extensive soft-tissue 
trauma, ophthalmic trauma, open resuscitation efforts, deep suturing to arrest 
haemorrhage, internal cardiac massage
Procedures and techniques in poorly visualised areas Digital palpation of a needle tip in a body cavity and/or the simultaneous presence 
of an HCP’s fingers and a needle or other sharp instrument or object in a poorly 
visualised or highly confined anatomical site
Situations with significant risk of the patient biting the HCP Interactions with violent patients or patients experiencing an epileptic seizure
EPPs = exposure-prone procedures; HCP = healthcare professional.
*Adapted from Centers for Disease Control[15] and Henderson et al.[7] 
Table 2. Standard universal precautions*
Barrier precautions Wear gloves when:
 in contact with blood and body fluids, mucous membranes, or non-intact skin  
 of all patients
handling items or surfaces soiled with blood or body fluids
performing venepuncture and other vascular access procedures
Double-glove for all invasive procedures 
Change gloves:
during long procedures
after contact with each patient
Wear masks, protective eyewear or face shields when:
performing procedures likely to generate droplets of blood or other body fluids 
Wear gowns or aprons when:
performing procedures likely to generate splashes of blood or other body fluids
Hand washing Wash hands and other skin surfaces
immediately and thoroughly if contaminated with blood or other body fluids
directly after gloves are removed
Prevent sharps injuries Do not recap, remove from disposable syringes, or manipulate needles by hand
Immediately place all disposable syringes and sharp items in puncture-resistant 
containers for disposal
Locate puncture-resistant containers as close as practical to the use area
Minimise mouth-to-mouth resuscitation Equip all areas where resuscitation is likely to be performed with mouthpieces, 
resuscitation bags or other ventilation devices
HCP with exudative lesions or weeping dermatitis Refrain from all direct patient care and handling patient care equipment until the 
condition resolves
HCP = healthcare professional.
*Adapted from Centers for Disease Control.[19] 
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vaccination is approximately 92% effective 
in immunocompetent adults <40 years 
of age, and only 84% effective in those 
aged ≥40 years.[7] All vaccine recipients 
with anti-HBs <10 IU/L after the primary 
vaccine series should be investigated 
for chronic HBV infection (hepatitis B 
surface antigen) and non-vaccine exposure 
(hepatitis B core antibody (anti-Hbc)). 
If both tests are negative, a second series 
of single or double vaccine doses can 
be given.[8] If anti-HBs remains <10  IU/L 
after the second vaccine series, the indi-
vidual is classified as a non-responder 
and should receive hepatitis B-specific 
immunoglobulin after exposure to a 
known HBV-infected individual.[8]
As from 2014, a new cohort of potentially 
Extended Program on Immunization (EPI)-
vaccinated healthcare students started their 
training. Only 16% of persons vaccinated 
at age <1 year are estimated to have 
detectable anti-HBs ≥10 mIU/mL 18 years 
later. However, they generally show good 
immunological memory, with 60 - 97.4% 
showing protective anti-HBs levels after a 
booster dose of HBV vaccine, and are then 
considered protected.[8,9]
HIV
In 2006, patients with HIV-related diseases 
occupied more than half of the hospital 
beds in sub-Saharan Africa, and in SA, even 
in the era of widely available antiretroviral 
therapy (ART), at least 44% of medical 
admissions are of HIV-infected patients.[10] 
Post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) is advised 
in all cases of occupational exposure with 
perceptible risk. The Southern African HIV 
Clinicians Society 2008 PEP guidelines[11] 
recommend the use of two nucleos(t)ide 
reverse transcriptase inhibitors together with 
either a non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase 
inhibitor (NNRTI), efavirenz, or a protease 
inhibitor (PI), lopinavir/ritonavir. The newly 
revised 2013 US Public Health Services PEP 
guidelines[12] advise the use of tenofovir (TDF) 
and emtricitabine together with the integrase 
strand transfer inhibitor raltegravir (RAL). 
This regimen is effective and better tolerated 
than NNRTI- and PI-based regimens. RAL 
has the additional advantage that restricted 
availability limits the likelihood of drug 
resistance. A combination of zidovudine 
(AZT)/lamivudine (3TC)/RAL can be used 
in HCPs with pre-existing renal disease, and 
an HIV expert should be consulted in cases 
of pregnancy, breastfeeding, serious medical 
disease in the HCP, and known or suspected 
HIV drug resistance in the source patient.
It is vital to ensure that the full 28-day 
course is completed. This can be achieved 
through active management of side-effects 
and anxiety.[11] Follow-up is essential and 
should specifically address condom use, as 
well as the timing of subsequent HIV and 
hepatitis tests. Post-PEP HIV testing should 
be performed by serial enzyme-linked 
immunosorbent assay (ELISA) testing, and 
there is currently no consensus on the use 
of polymerase chain reaction testing in this 
setting. A case may be made for the use of 
the HIV viral load (VL) for testing HCPs 
presenting with possible acute HIV infection 
after exposure to high-risk patients. These 
tests do, however, have several limitations 
such as a window period (albeit shorter than 
for ELISA) and considerable cost.
Finally, it is essential to exclude active 
HBV in all HCPs on PEP, because the effect 
of withdrawing TDF or 3TC after 1 month 
of treatment in the setting of active HBV is 
uncertain.
Hepatitis C virus
There is currently no vaccine or effective 
PEP to protect against HCV after exposure. 
Effective treatment of HCV is available, 
however, and it is important to identify and 
document HCV exposure and monitor for 
acute infection.
Management of HCPs 
infected with HBV/HIV/
HCV
The optimal management of HCPs infected 
with BBVs has always been controversial 
because so few cases have been documented 
and randomised controlled clinical 
trials are not feasible. Management is 
further complicated by the absence of a 
comprehensive SA policy or guideline. By 
default, cases are managed on an ad hoc 
basis and monitoring is sparse or absent. 
Using international guidelines as a point of 
reference, with due cognisance of the local 
context, we suggest specific management 
strategies in the following sections, as well 
as in Table 3.
Any management programme should 
start with acknowledging the importance 
of HCPs knowing their infection status 
with respect to all three BBVs, and their 
obligation to know it, especially when 
per forming EPPs.[7] This approach allows 
for protection of patients from nosocomial 
transmission, but also enables appropriate and 
timely access to care for HCPs. HCPs are at 
greater risk of active tuberculosis (TB), as 
well as drug-resistant TB, than the general 
population, a situation exacerbated by the 
presence of immunodeficiency.[13,14] In SA, 
owing to the burden of infectious diseases 
and the general lack of adequate infection 
control practices, HCPs are exposed to extra-
ordinary risk in their work environment and 
every effort should be made to protect them.
Once HCPs are aware that they are 
infected with one of the BBVs, they should 
be supported by the medical fraternity, 
e.g. through expert review panels in their 
institution or health department or by a 
designated specialist in the field.[7] The 
role of such a panel or expert should be 
supportive, not punitive, and they should 
be governed by the professional rules of 
confidentiality and non-discrimination. 
Expert advisers can assist infected students 
and practitioners in minimising the risk 
of transmission and disease progression 
by advising on appropriate treatment, 
monitoring and infection control practices.
International guidelines advise monitoring 
of infectivity by means of DNA serum levels, 
i.e. VL, with restriction of EPP above a 
certain cut-off point (Table 3). Activities 
not classified as exposure prone are not 
restricted, provided the HCP does not have 
a medical condition, such as HIV-related 
neurocognitive dysfunction, resulting in the 
inability to perform tasks; there is no prior 
evidence of transmission of a BBV by the 
HCP to a patient; and the HCP follows 
standard infection control guidelines, is able 
to perform regular duties, and is closely 
monitored by an expert review panel, occup-
Table 3. VL criteria and testing frequency for HCPs infected with HBV/HCV/HIV*
HBV† HCV HIV
No restrictions VL <104‡ VL <104 VL <5 × 102§
Restriction of EPPs VL ≥104 or HBeAg+ VL ≥104 VL ≥5 × 102
VL testing frequency Twice a year Twice a year Twice a year
VL = viral load; HCPs = healthcare professionals; HBV = hepatitis B virus; HCV = hepatitis C virus; EPPs = exposure-prone 
invasive procedures (Table 1); HBeAg = hepatitis B e antigen.
*Adapted from Henderson et al.[7]
†Standardised guidelines based on VL are constrained by the following factors: (i) variability of HBV DNA levels among 
chronically infected individuals; (ii) paucity of data linking levels of viraemia to risk of transmission; (iii) variable reliability and 
reproducibility of the molecular tests used to measure HBV DNA; (iv) lack of standardisation among the different tests used 
to detect HBV DNA; and (v) the variability and durability of therapeutic antiviral effects, and specifically the length of time 
viraemia can be effectively suppressed before ‘escape’ mutant viruses emerge.[7]
‡Unit of measurement for VL = copies/mL.
§In HIV a VL threshold of 500 copies/mL is selected, since this is the cut-off level for viral ‘blibs’.
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ational safety staff and a physician. Importantly, infection with any of 
the three BBVs per se is not viewed as sufficient to warrant preclusion 
of the study or practice of medicine.[7,15]
Reporting and management 
responsibilities
Neither the Health Professions Council of South Africa nor the 
South African Medical Association (SAMA) oblige HCPs to 
know their HIV infection status or disclose this status to an 
employer. Both encourage voluntary counselling and testing after an 
exposure incident.[16,17] Infected practitioners are encouraged to seek 
counselling from an ‘appropriate professional source’ familiar with 
current recommendations, who can advise on the need for restricting 
professional practice. The SAMA guidelines stress the importance of 
upholding confidentiality, especially in healthcare institutions, and 
the right to non-discrimination, as delineated in the SA Constitution 
(1996) and the Employment Equity Act.[17]
The ethics of managing infected HCPs are complex and will not be 
discussed in detail. The debate is strongly influenced by the ethical, 
professional and fiduciary responsibility HCPs have towards their 
patients. Suffice it to say that balance should be sought between 
the HCP’s right to confidentiality and non-discrimination and the 
patient’s right to non-maleficence and a safe environment.
While we support voluntary and confidential testing of HCPs, we 
argue that structures and procedures should be in place to facilitate 
such testing and that the individual should not be held responsible for 
the cost of testing. Ideally, institutions should have an expert review 
panel, or at minimum an occupational health officer, to monitor 
testing and take responsibility for follow-up of infected HCPs. 
Restriction of scope of practice should be evidence based and should 
not be applied if the HCP is adequately treated and is able to practise 
safely and competently.
An HCP who has been the source of patient exposure should 
report such an exposure to the occupational health officer and 
undergo testing for infection with BBVs. The patient should be 
informed of the exposure and of the outcome of the source’s BBV 
results, and be offered counselling and PEP as appropriate.[7] In order 
to protect confidentiality and in line with international guidelines, 
patients need not be informed of the name of the source or the exact 
circumstances of the exposure. Pre-notification of patients regarding 
their HCP’s infection status is also not indicated, provided infection 
is appropriately managed.
In addition, the following precautions are advised in HIV-infected 
HCPs: (i) screen for active TB every 6 - 12 months; (ii) isoniazid 
prophylactic therapy (treat tuberculin skin test (TST)-negative 
HCPs for 6 months and TST-positive HCPs for 18 months); (iii) 
pneum ococcal vaccine as per current recommendations;[18] and (iv) 
influenza vaccine annually.
HIV-infected healthcare students deserve further mention. Given 
that students are more likely to experience exposure incidents, they 
should be offered special assignments while working in high-risk 
environments such as surgery and TB wards. They should be allowed 
to withdraw without penalty from any clinical setting they feel 
poses a high risk of transmission. Students who are not on optimal 
treatment should be encouraged to seek such treatment, and VL 
results and ART regimen changes should be reported to the dean 
or a designated person on an annual basis. The teaching institution 
should assist students in selecting career paths best suited to their 
specific situation, and students whose HBV, HCV and/or HIV 
cannot be effectively cleared or suppressed below the recommended 
thresholds should be encouraged to select careers that do not involve 
the highest-risk procedures.
Recommendations
In the absence of SA guidelines, we suggest the following basic 
principles as minimum requirements:
• All healthcare providers and all healthcare students should know
their infection and immune status (as appropriate) for all three
major BBVs.
• All HCPs not infected with HBV should be vaccinated and have
their immune status confirmed prior to initiation of training.
Chronic HBV infection must be excluded in non-responders.
• HCPs infected with HIV, HBV or HCV should seek treatment
and obtain expert advice, whether through an institutional
expert review panel, occupational health officer or specialist
in the field.
• Institutions and healthcare facilities should be familiar with current 
international guidelines on the management of occupational
exposures.
• All institutions should have a dedicated person, such as an
occupational health officer, who can monitor and support infected 
HCPs.
• All occupational injuries need to be documented and the data used 
to adapt training programmes and introduce innovative ways to
prevent such injuries.
• HCPs should have easy and confidential access to testing and
treatment for all three BBVs in their place of work.
• PEP should be individualised as more patients are on ART and
should be accompanied by adequate medical and psychological
support.
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